Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1984

The State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saunder : Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Linda E. Carter; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Saunders, No. 19054 (1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4599

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

-vGARY VANCE SAUNDERS,

Case No. 19054

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
An appeal from the conviction of Burglary, A Felony
of the Second Degree; Theft, a Felony of the Second Degree;
Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a Felony
of the Second Degree; and being a Habitual Criminal, a
Felony of the First Degree, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

LINDA E. CARTER
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 St3te Capitol Building
Lakp City, Utah 84lll
•
for Respondent

FILED
APR 1G1984

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Tl!

:ClJPHEME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-Hespondent
- -;--

Case No. 19054

GAPY VANCE SAUNDERS,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
An appeal from the conviction of Burglary, A Felony
of the Second Degree; Theft, a Felony of the Second Degree;
Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a Felony
of the Second Degree; and being a Habitual Criminal, a

Felony of the First Degree, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

L'INDA E. CARTER
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
[

j

' I

I' '

'I>- I J

l

SU i l

i "• · I
i

l

''-

1· · :·:-

':Jl"

j i ng

Table of Contents
CASES CITED
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) . . .
·f;:TPxas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967) . .
:hec< 1. Smith, 617 P. 2d 341 (Utah 1980) . . . .
Do11;-·v-:- r';hi_CJ_, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 96
S.Ct. 2240 (1976) . . . . . . . . .
:c:· C'/1 ·1 , 1Jn i t e d St at e s , 3 31 F . 2 d 8 5 ( 19 6 4 ) . .
'cat on, :;1)9 P. 2d at 1116. . . . . . . . . . .
•1.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 48 L.Ed.2d
-11 9 4 ( 19 7 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) . .
J'1icKenzey v. State, 225 S.E. 2d 512 (Georgia 1976).
49 L.Ed. 2d at 98 . . . . . . . . .
. ..
v. State, 535 S.W. 2d 357 (Texas Crim. App. 1976).
.SnlPm v. Helms, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983), . . . . . . .
State
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961).
State v, Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977) . . . . .
State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982).
State ·1. Gotfrey, 598 P. 2d 1325 (Utah 1979) . . .
State 1. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 283-84, 221 P.2d
605, 617 (1950) . . . . . . . . . .
State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975) . .
. .
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963).
State •1. Yerekes, 622 P. 2d 1161 (Utah 1980) . . . . .
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 771 (1969).
Ctnte v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982)
StatZ v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 669 (Utah 1982).
671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983).
State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saunders, Case No. 18748
3ta•e of TJtah v. Gary Vance Saunders and Buddy Clark
Anderson, Case No. 30202 . . . . . .
of TJtah v. Gary Vance Saunders and Michael Lee
White, Case No. 31349, (Also referred No. 31149)
v.
111 Utah 9, 20-21, 175 P.2d 1016,
1021-22 (1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P. 2d 388 (1957) · ·
1 • St . C l a ire ,
3 Utah 2 d 2 3 0 , 2 8 2 P . 2 d 3 2 3 ( 19 5 5 ) .
P.2d 669 (Utah 1982) . . · • ·
,
___::-,_.-_'!Ti ::iclPll, f'.:39 P. 2d 146 (Utah 1981) . .
Segna, 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977)
_

:'.r

1.

ii

PAGE
24,26
24,25,26
16
19
7,8
20,21
15,16
25,26
16
19
17
22,23,24
13' 15
20
11,12

6

11
20,21
13
11
11
11,12

7

23

4

5
4
12
15
14

7

19
20

STATUTES CITED
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11
j76-6-202 (1953 as amended) .
j;"s-6-404 (1953 as amended) . .
Ar111
576-10-503(2) (1953 as amended)
...,b
Ann. '.;7fi-8-1001 (1953 as amended).
'qr, ···,J<o Ar.r:. 577-3S-9(d) (1953 as amended)
;1r1n.
,',fin.

F 11 ·'·
1

0

I. Ru 1'·0
., :L eu1es

Evidence, Rule 44.
of' Evidence, Rule 45.
of' Evidence, Rule 55.
f

PAGE
25

1
1
1
1

5,7

11
11

11,13

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
re1

Constitution, Eighth Amendment
Slqtes Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
2titution, Article I, Section 7 . . . . .

iii

21
22
22

-I TliE
-

.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------· l

.:;TE OF UTAH,

-·:,.,r•

1

·r Al!CE SAUNDERS,

Case No. 19054

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, GARY VANCE SAUNDERS, appeals for
tne sonviction of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, in

v1olation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended);
lhPft, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code

Ann

§76-6-404 (1953 as amended); Possession of a Firearm

oy a Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation

•cr

)tah Code Ann. §76-10-503(2) (1953 as amended); and

1

b ing a Habitual Criminal, a First Degree Felony, in
0

of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, GARY VANCE SAUNDERS, was tried by
Jt

28-29, 1982, before the Honorable James

·1n1 found guilty of the Burglary, Theft, and
1· a Firearm by a Restricted Person charges.

On December 30, 1982, appellant was

the

Court and found guilty of tieing a Habitual C":t'iminal
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prisnn for
an indeterminate term of 1 to

years for the Burglary;

1 to 15 years for the Theft; 1 to 15 years for the
Possession of a Firearm, and 5 years to life for the
Habitual Criminal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below or a remand of the case to the
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the early evening of April 23, 1982, a
television set, microwave oven, two firearms, a rifle,
a box of ammunition, and various items of jewelry were
taken from the residence of Mr.

and Mrs. Berry Phelps,

1672 East 7000 South, Salt Lake City (T.18).

Mrs.

Phelps, whose husband was away for the weekend (T.13),
was not at home the night of the 24th, having left
in the day to stay with a daughter (T.14).

One of the

firearms and television set were subsequently recovered
by the police (T. 52,
The :tate 1 s

Stacy

Williams wh·

211).
c8:,,_.
L'.:',-1+-

'.N'1:-,

tJCJ.si?,j upon th1:_·

n-l 'i

:1

1

of

'.'f

t

'

1·

his involvement in the burglary and theft
7UOO South in return for his testimony

·ring the
i-J
t

i;

cc;·
qqj

L3'':1

incident (T.40-41, 67).

Mr. Williams

that the appellant participated in both the
:,wi theft of the items from the Phelps residence

:C°•:tlng the place (T.44), springing the lock (T.46),
,;att1ering the items taken (T.49-50).

Williams

tJrther tPstified he stored the stolen items at the house
t1is brother, Timmy Shunk (T.53) and also later sold
guns to a fence, Amos Armijo, and the television
individual, Marvin Powell (T.56, 57-58).

Mr.

Williams testified that Mr. Shunk's residence was their
place" to store things (T.52), and that Mr.
Arm1jr was "our fence"

(T.53).

Several officers testified to a multi-agency
"1'''''2t1on that resulted in the recovery of items from
.is burglary from Amos Armijo (T.75-104), and a resulting
c'"'cmPnt from Stacy Williams (T.90-91).

Appellant was

with the Armijos (T.79-80) when they were attempting
away with the merchandise.
The appellant did not testify and counsel stipulated
as a restricted person, incarcerated at the

'·le'

l'r·\ son and housed in a half-way house at the
''·'· .ff"pn.se (T. 74).
: !

cicid•:
t;

3

ri

Prior to trial, counsel for

motion to sever the count of Possession

Restricted Person which was denied by

-3-

the Honorable Peter F.

Leary on December 21, 19·'32.

T\-:e

Appellant presented evJ_,ience that. Timmy Shunk was iri fact
in jail on April 24,

1';182, through two officers involved

in keeping the records on inmates in the jail (T.112, 130).
Subsequent to Appellant's conviction on the burglary,
theft, and possession of firearm counts, the Court conducted
a hearing on the habitual criminal charge.

The State intro-

duced prior felony convictions and commitments (Exhibits
7, 8, 9).

Case No.

31349, State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saunderc

and Michael Lee White was at times referred to as Case No.
31149.

White's name was stricken at some time, a fact which

':he State could not clarify (T.172).

That conviction was on

June 21, 1978, and Mr. Saunders was commited to the prison oro
June 29, 1978 (Exhibit 7).

This exhibit was admitted over

defense counsel's objections regarding foundation as to
whether the person who certified it actually had custody
of the record, whether Appellant was adequately represented
by counsel and whether the commitment was properly authenticat 0 '
without a case number on the sheriff's receipt (T.171-73).
Exhibit 8, Case No. 18748, State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saund..2.'·
was admitted over defense counsel's objections as to founilat'.
authentication of who wrote the first page and how lt becam•
part of the record and the rpmoteness of the conviction
(T.173-73).

Appellant's convlction on that offense was ·:·rt

11, l'Jf;4,

ir,1

vias f'romised probation by both his attorney

1,,

::;t,1t.e's

-1, 1

Furthermore, Appellant

pleaded guilty to the 1964 conviction only

,, 1

,,,

(Exhibit 8).

attorney (T.197).

He stated he would not

pleaded guilty if he had known he would go to prison
The State presented no evidence that Mr. Saunders

':. l')S),

representation or whether there was a knowing

caJ

of counsel or his constitutional rights (T.200).
Exhibit 9, Case No.

30202, State of Utah v. Gary

7ance Saunders and Buddy Clark Anderson was also admitted

in support of the State's habitual criminal charge over
derense counsel's objections.

because it could not be verified that the person

''hJPet
:ifhO

certified the record had custody.

,·hai-1gt.:

;th"Se
'l 1

Again there was a foundational

"t i

There was a date

f'rom 1977 to 1976 and there was no evidence as to
handwriting was on the affidavit.

OJ ·; i

Furthermore, the

stated, "of my own free will I have conferred with

t

----

"

with no name filled in (T.175-78).

·:curt subsequently convicted Appellant on the habitual
·,r1

·h0rge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
fi
·:i.

di

TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
PCSSESSION OF A FIREARM COUNT.
:ode ilnn. §77-35-9(d)

(1953 as amended) provides

nf offenses where there is a prejudicial

-5-

effect:
If it appe8rs that a defendant or
the prusecution is prejudiced by
a joinder of offenses or defendants
in an indictment or information, or
by a joinder for trial together, the
Court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts,
or grant a severance of defendants,
or provide such other relief as
justice requires.
In this case, Appellant was greatly prejudiced by the
trial of the Possession of a Firearm Count with the
Burglary and Theft charges.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the severance
issue in State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979).
In Gotfrey, charges of rape upon the defendant's stepdaughters and sodomy involving the step-son were
improperly joined.
joinder resulted in

The trial court's erroneous
error.

In reversing

the Court stated;
The purpose of that statute is to allow
joinder of offenses and thus eliminate
multiple prosecutions and conserve time
and effort when justice can best be
served thereby.
But care must be
taken that the statute is not misused
to deprive an accused of a fair trial.
Id. at 1328.

In State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (1980), the
1

•·niec Court similarly reversed convictions on two
spxual assaults that were tried together.

The

1' neld that defendant's right to due process of law

'):ated where the jury had heard evidence relating
, '"

se>parate offenses.

The Court found that the

nrpjudicial impact was too great where the charges were
nnt a single criminal transaction and did not evince a
·r,cnrr,rJn scheme or design.

Id. at 356.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals announced
' similar position in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85
In Drew, the Court saw judicial economy as the
advantage of joinder of offenses.
(1)
,,r

The Court noted four

the defendant could become embarrassed

have difficulty in presenting defenses;

(2)

the jury

may Infer a criminal disposition and thereby prejudice
':r'" dF·fendant; (3)

the jury may view the evidence

·1m,Jl'ltively; and (4)
r.·s'ility may surface.

a prejudicial latent feeling of
Id. at 88.

The Court reversed

irtions for attempted robbery and robbery on this basis.
Most recently, this Court held that the denial of
r

hr1 lo

sever a Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted
from an Aggravated Assault Charge did not amount

"\"l '.r due process.

State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669

'"he Court, however, did not address the question
there was an abuse of discretion in denying the
'" lPr'

th" statutory terms of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9C.dl

-7-

(1953 as amended) as the appellant Jid not make a timely
In this case, appellant timely moved to have the
Possession of a Firearm count severed from the Burglary
and Theft charges.

While it may not violate due process

of law, the appellant was clearly prejudiced by the joinder
of these counts.

The appellant did not testify.

Therefore,

no evidence of prior felony convictions was admissible on
impeachment grounds.

And yet, evidence of his status

as an inmate of the Utah State Prison, and thus the
obvious inference of a felony conviction, was admissible
to prove he was a restricted person.

While judicial

economy was served by allowing one trial on all of the
counts, appellant was denied his statutory right to a
severance where he was prejudiced by the joinder of
charges.

Jurors, as human beings, can hardly be asked

to accept evidence of a criminal past for one purpose
and not to consider it when viewing the defendant and
the case as a whole.

The concerns of the Court in

Drew v. United States, supra, were present here. There
is no way to know whether the jury inferred a criminal
disposition by appellant or what prejudices against
appellant this evidence created.

The policy behind

excluding evidew:e of f"'lony c·c,nvictions unless the
defendant testifies applies herP as well.

It was an

abuse of discretion t0 Jeny arpell8nt's motion to sever
the counts in this

-POINT II
WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTIONS

1

r: A rn STRI AL WHEN THE JURY HEARD AND SAW

];)ADMISSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE.

'11cee times during the trial the jury was exposed

1

1r.cid'111s \blP and prejudicial evidence.
"'

Twice a State's

rPferred to multiple burglaries and thefts despite

lo

Lourt's ruling, pursuant to then

1Ps

Rule

55 of the Utah

of Evidence, that such evidence was inadmissible.

On

r,,,, nccasion, an unrelated firearm was left sitting on
desk in full view of the jury.

Each incident

and in combination, created a prejudicial impact on
appellant's case and warranted the declaration of a mistrial.
Prior to trial, the Court ruled that the State could
evidence of other burglaries unless it established
J

l)Jnjatiun of materiality and gave the defense an opportunity
)tjb'L

(T.10-11).

Nevertheless, the State adduced the

ing testimony:
Q·

Did you have a conversation about the two firearms
the television set and the microwave oven?

;;

Yeah.
Who was participating in that conversation?

':11,,

'".'!
'1 •

s;:i td what in that conversation?
me,

"Well, I got to be going back to

'u1- r·,ny ho•Jse so I might as well take that stuff
:1" 1 st ore it where we are storing it at."

-9-

Q:

Did you have a

regular place to store

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Where was that?

A:

My brother's.

Q:

What's his name?

A:

Timmy Shunk.

Q:

(By Mr.

Housley)

In this conversation that you

had at Gary's house, did he tell you what to do
after you got it down to the place to store it?
A:

Yes.

Q:

What did he tell you?

A:

He told me to call our fence--his name is Amos--

to see what he wanted to buy.

(T.52-53).

Q:

Amos?

A:

Yeah.
There was no foundation as to materiality and no

chance for counsel to nbject prior to the testimony.
the discussions at the bar, counsel for appellant twice m, 1'1'
for a mistrial, vihich mnt ions the court denied (T. 96-?7 l ·

-lu-

ror mistrial based on the presence of an unrelated
Lrl1larly denied (T.96).
Th1 s Court formulated a two-part test, embodying
• 11"

fc,rmer' Utah Rules of Evidence 45 and 55,

for determining

r,•·ther evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by a

.•1

'lcfendant. should be allowed to be heard by a jury. 1

The

f11st part of the analysis required a showing that the

P11jence of other crimes was relevant and probative of a
TI2teridl fact, State v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982);

3Late v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982); State v. Kerekes,
P 2d 1161 (Utah 1980); State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257,

""l

P.2d 771 (1969).

The second part of the analysis required

that, if the evidence was relative and probative, its proha•ive value outweighed its prejudicial effect pursuant to
tne r·e,:iuirements of the former Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
"iirlence.

State v. Mccardell, supra.

In Forsyth, supra, this Court defined what it meant
the terms "relevant" and "probative".
... -··--

Quoting State v. Harries,

-· - - - - - - - - -

SS provided:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a
r .. r "n
""!lrc\tt•:d a crime or evil wrong on a specified
' .. , '', '"' inarlmissible to prove his disposition to commit
·!vil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
<nuther crime or civil wrong on another specified
·.· / s11b.1ect to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is
·. :. 11",Ft1
to prove some other material fact
' 1'
"r.sence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
1
•
..
:r·"r,:.iration, plan, knowledge or identity.
0

-11-

Any pertir,cnr fact which throws
light qpon thP subject under
judicial consideration, the
accused's guilt or innocence
of the crime for which he is
charged is admissible.
6LJl P. 2d at 1175.

The Court also quoted State v. Scott, 111

Utah 9, 20-21, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-22 (1947) which stated:
The basic rule of admissibility
of evidence is that all evidence
having probative value--that is,
that tends to prove an issue is
admissible ....
Id.

The Court held in Forsyth that evidence of investors

other than the four victims was admissible as to false
representations of ownership of real estate, of the amount
being raised for development, of the number of investors,
and of the overdue status of some of the refunds owing.
Evidence that certain investments were not repaid was not
admissible, but was held to be harmless error in the case.
Subsequently, in State v.

Mccardell, supra, this

Court held that evidence of the possession of stolen checks
from the same owner was admissible against a defendant char:;;.
with forgery.

The Court held not only that the evidence was

relevant to and probative of the defendant's intent and
knowledge, but also that th•

protative value was not suh-

stantially outwei 1T,h'

i rejudi•:ial e'.'fect

Rule 45.

j

h:;

"

purs·.1ant '

che lat tr"" Lil l:inr in12: t e·st is the scc•:ond r:;art ,·,f '

analysis.

- I -

)'1r+-

has held evidence of prior crimes or

inadmissible where the prejudice is too great

t,

", ·<rnd prong of the analysis.

Evidence that the

'0! bePn charged with a crime in the past, even

,,,,Tl, r,,,

I ' t'

t.r·ied on the charge, was prejudicial error in

icY:sc,n, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961).
,,,,'

Test-

1.bout a prior arrest for a similar crime required

10re,al

in Stc1te v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963).
In this case, the trial court ruled that evidence

"'[,Pt'

burglaries was inadmissible unless a foundation
hy the State on materiality and the defense had an

"f'f'1r'tunity to object.

There is no legal issue as to which

Jnder Rule 55 such evidence might fall under.
'

0

11, +here is a factual issue as to whether the testimony

tLµ gun constituted evidence of other burglaries and

+-r:"

State met its obligations pursuant to the Court's

Ea:h statement and the gun individually, and in
iri21

i•,n, created the obvious inference of other burglaries.

,,,,,. r ·' Lave a "regular place" for storing stolen items
,,
't•

r',,

'11\.n

is so familiar as to be "our fence" unless
crimes involved.

;lt i
j

The obvious conclusion

is that appellant was engaged in other

conclusion would have been enhanced by

l'},
'1f1

.;x '::raneous gun by the jurors.

-13-

The State laid no foundation and the defense had
no opportunity prior to the introduction of the testimony
to argue the issue before the court.

At no time did the

prosecutor attempt to establish why the references to
other burglaries was material.

The statements arose during

the course of simple inquiries as to where the items from
this particular burglary had gone.

Moreover, taken by

surprise, defense counsel could only move for a mistrial
without any opportunity to prevent the introduction of this
testimony.

The court's order was violated and the denials

of the motions for mistrial were error as there was no
probative value to the evidence and, even if there was
any probative value, it was certainly outweighed by the
prejudicial effect of the jury knowing other burglaries
had been committed.
The prejudicial effect was further exacerbated
as the judge did not strike the witness' statement or
instruct the jury to disregard it.

Without an instruction

of that nature, the evidence is left intact for the jurys
consideration.
P.2d 323 (1955).

State v. St. Claire, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282
Thus the jury was left to consider the key

witness' testimony as to other unrelated alleged criminal
acts by appellant in determining his guilt or innocence.
The admission of the statements to the jury is
the type of error which can be regarded as a mere irregula•'
or of such inconsequential nature that it could not have

-14-

r .,•. ' t•I l· 1 1 '.

v, thP substant lal rights of the appellant.
supra; State v. Siebert,

6 Utah 2d 198, 310

Consequently, the failure to declare a

:

i,, 'his case was error where the logical inference of the
·t11T.·

that the appellant was a bad person, a criminal,

v1;Js

J the tPstimony served no probative purpose.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WHEN THREE JURORS
VIEWED HIM IU SHACKLES AND PRISON CLOTHES.
On December 29, 1982, the second day of trial, Mr.
was brought in his prison clothes, in foot chains,
and in handcuffs before three jurors who were waiting out in
t•1e hallway

(Supp. T.133).

At that point in time, Appellant's

"ttorney moved for a mistrial in chambers which was denied.
In Estelle v. Williams,
11 '

425 U.S.

501, 48 L.Ed. 2d 1194

EJ, the United States Supreme Court stated that a State
compel a defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison

clothes.

Although in that case the Court held that there was no
1 violation where defense counsel had failed to

jt:ect, the Court viewed forcing defendant to wear prison clothes
:w Dbrid;;ement of his fundamental rights to due process and

""

µrotectlon of the law.

rre

L'ot1
·!'

r:!'

The Court further stated that the

1 nnocence accorded to the defendant

is violated

''r'.."" r1·ison clothes.

,,

' L•,lit to a fair trial is a fundamental
cc.ccured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 •·· :;
ion of innocence, although not
1
•'· ·1 ·111:it
in the Constitution, is a basic
·r:i1.·)n·:nt of a fair trial under our system
"'t '!

'Ut i··0.
it•.r;

·rnitted]

Close judicial scrutiny is required

-l'i-

to look at any particular procedure.

However, with regard

prison clothes, the Court stated:
The potential effects of presenting an
accused before the jury in prison attire
need not, however, be measured in the abstract.
Courts have, with few exceptions, determined
that an accused should not be compelled to
go to trial in prison or jail clothing because
of the possible impairment of the presumption
so basic to the adversary system.
Id. at 130 [cites omitted].
The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally held that

&

defendant has a right not to stand trial in prison clothes.
In Chess v. Smith, 617 P. 2d 341 (Utah 1980), the Court reman;.
a case on a writ of habeas corpus, stating:
The prejudicial effect that flows from a
appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it
is so potentially prejudicial as to create a
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in
a criminal trial.
Id. at 344.

The Utah Court has even gone so far as to requi:·

that a judge inquire sua sponte if a defendant wishes to wale
the right not to appear in prison clothes.
In this case, the appellant was not in his prison
clothes during the trial, but the prejudicial effect was the
same.

In fact, the prejudicial effect is probably sharper

where the jurors see appellanL on the second day of trial
the first time in prison clothes and chains.

A slmtlar

situation occurred in McKenzey v. State,
(Georgia 1976), where a defendant was brought into the •co 11 :'
in prison clothes and handcuffs.

Although thee 1'ourt sc:iij '

1

· 1 .t.1, c: were not prejudicial in a case prosecuting
1

,,,,

f'r)r

Ps·:etpe, it held that the defendant was denied

J11eo t.0 the handcuffs.
11nJue security risk,

The Court said that, where
the common law rule applied

r,ndant has a right to be tried free of shackles
fo M0ore v.

r,

1

i'! (,:,

•S:'•t

- 1.

State, 535 S.W. 2d 357 (Texas Criminal

a Texas Court also reversed where the defendant
lnto the courtroom handcuffed in front of the
Court held that, especially where defendant was
for security reasons during his murder trial,

>tP1••

;ias no justification for his being viewed by the jury
The defendant's constitutional right to a

fr,

ion of innocence was infringed by the jury seeing

r

kled.

'.3h:J.

In this case, close judicial scrutiny of the potential
f.-

1'11•

p

can only result in a new trial.

The appellant walked

elevator in prison clothes with handcuffs and ankle

:f

r,alr.r

"'.'hree jurors were standing nearby.

Up until that

'urors had only seen the appellant in street clothes.
••

1
:

'

'hP ,iur•)rs were aware that the appellant was in a
it
1

the time of the offense, they did not know

'Jt•' •,-rcis presently in prison.

:•c'.

·1s

t!le Utah Supreme Court has noted, there
rej11dicial effect for a jury to see a

,,

prison clothes.

This is not a case

' ' ·,nt •.-nc. 4isruptive in the courtroom or on the
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way to court

or where

other evidence.

vio.s uvt-"rwhf:'lmlng f!,iJ\lt-

This is a case that

of one, and only one, witness.

ft'<)m

1r-.

r•·stt'd ·•n thP credit l'

The appellant's right tut"

presumed innocent and to a trial by an impartial jury mand:,1.
that he be given a new trial where he is not paraded in fror·
of any jurors in prison clothes and shackles.

POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A PRESUMPTIOil
OF INNOCENCE AND NOT TO TESTIFY WHEN THE PROSECUTOR COMMENTED ON THE FAILURE TO PROVE THE
APPELLANT NOT GUILTY.
In a criminal case the State has the burden of proc.
and cannot comment on a defendant's failure to prove his
innocence.

In this case the appellant did not testify.

only witness called by the defense was for impeachment purposo•
The emphasis of the closing argument on the appellant's beha1 ·
was that the State had failed to meet its burden to prove 'che
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and yet, the
prosecutor stated in the rebuttal part of his closing argument that the appellant had not proved his innocence.
The first thing [that defense counsel said]
was that the defendant is not guilty, the
defendant did not
t:his burglar:;, the
defendant did not commit this
the
defendant did not possess these firearms
Now, there is no proof of thclt, •,lbc••ilutel:;
no proof of that.
( T. 149).

: 11

1·J··r· '.'or you

to say a defendant
you would have to say that
1 '11i1liiitrts is lying.
You would have
' 1 ·c1t
c:t.acy Williams is not telling
· itL :ibout his participation, about
.r•.·t1·l'lnt's participation in this case.
1
1,.,,, thrt's not proof --- that's not proof
· : ..·J' l:•· ·iitln't do it.
t

"'c

111

IriyJr.

·1.

Ohio,

426 U.S.

610, 49 L.Ed.

2d 91, 96

l, the United States Supreme Court held that
c .·f'·

I

•1

r,• 'c vist-arrest silence cannot be used to impeach
critects the defendant's exercise of his Miranda

'r 1-

- f--

r :,

Irr such circumstances, it would be fundamentally
unrair and a deprivation of due process to allow
tl1P arrested
person's silence to be used to
an explanation subsequently offered
'lt t r·Lil.

· ':,[, :3upreme Court
;;r..:.r,

'1

[

has similarly recognized error

cc"··1to;o corrunents on the defendant's post-arrest
Ir :t.ate v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the

''.

r r' Jsecutor' s comments during closing argument
1

to tell an officer he was an unwilling

c:,·"·1· 1·1CJted rcbbery was reversible error.
.,,.

This

·)Lt,,s th·· defendant's right not to incriminate

·111 ! t µI

Constitution and not to give

·.: r· 'lnder Article I, Section 12 of the Utah

-lJ-

Even more pertinent to this case, the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 19'17), held l",,
a prosecutor cannot comment on the defendant's failure to
testify at trial.

In his closing argument in Eaton, the

prosecutor noted that only the defendant "really knows what
took place" and queried "what does the defendant tell us?"
The prosecutor continued on in his closing to state that
the jury had never heard any evidence that a prosecuting
witness was "out to get blacks", apparently a defense raised
by the defendant.

Id. at 1115.

The Court found that such

remarks were improper and prejudicial.

In so doing, the

Court distinguished an earlier case of State v. Kazda, 540

P, 2d 949 (Utah 1975), where the Court had held the prosecutor'
closing argument proper analysis of the evidence.

In Kazda,

the prosecutor had said that "the defense has presented no
evidence as to why the defendant was out there.
doing out there?"

at 950.

What was he

The Court said that this was

a comment on the total amount of evidence or lack of evidenc'
and not an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure
to testify.
If is also impermissible for a prosecutor to misstat'
the law in his closing argument.

In United States v. Seg1,c,

555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977), the prosecutor stated that

tli-

defendant wac; presumed sane amj in essence placed the ll

J·ct

on the defendant to show that he was insane.

- 1' -

1

H

The Court n

,,,

J,.

1 tu:.t

"I
1 ,,

'!11c•·d his expert witnesses no such presumption

['t'

the prosecutor then had a burden to show
beyond a reasonable doubt.

,,,,,

-'1Pr,s:''l

1

The Court thus

murr1Pr conviction where it concluded that the

,,,, s,_,,,11tor ha1i misstated the law.
In tl1 'Ls case, the prosecutor overstepped the bounds

33ing the totality of the evidence.
10'1'

He misstated the

tr,e tiurden of proof, improperly placing a burden to

,,,,

the defendant innocent on defense counsel.

This is not

·,1st dLscussion of the analysis of the evidence or the lack

thereof as in Kazda.

As the Court in Eaton stated, it is

irnpr,opPr fur a prosecutor to make a "thinly disguised"
to introduce the fact that the defendant did not testify
"nd then allow the jury to draw inferences of guilt from that
1 lJre to testify.
'udice

569 P. 2d at 1116.

In this case, the pre-

obvious where the jury might then have believed that

-h" '1f1pel lant

had a burden to prove that he was not guilty.

1

leprived him of his fundamental right to a fair and
ial Jury verdict and to his right not to give evidence
·c'.-r.•t

him,•plf in any trial.
POINT V
11 WA,
1

TO SENTENCE APPELLANT UNDER
if7,1,-,- li!1K111JhL CRIMINAL STATUTE.
,1,

i

l ,_:riminal statute under which Appellant
lo apply the principle of proportionality

'•,.

Amendment's proscription of cruel and

unusual punishment.

Further, the admission of documentary

evidence of two prior guilty pleas without proper foundatic,
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
of the Utah Constitution where the evidence did not show
that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered those plNs.
A.

SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER UTAH'S HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Utah's habitual criminal statute which provides

sentencing in cases where there have been two prior felony
convictions and commitments is unconstitutional as applied
to him.

Because the statute makes no distinctions between

property offenses and offenses involving violence, it fails
to meet the first prong of the test set forth in Solem v.
103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983).
In Solem v. Helms, the Supreme Court held that a
proportionality review prevented imposition of a 1 ife sent enc:
without possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist
statute where the petitioner had six prior felony convictions.
The Court announced objective factors to consider in
sentences.

First, courts should be guided by the gravity of

the offense and the harshness of the penalty.

Second, sentui

imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction may
for comparison.

J.

Third, sentences imposed for the same offPr,:·

in other jurisdictions may provide guidance. Id. at

.

t:;•Jns

,,,, ,11

can be made in light of the harm caused

0r to society.

,t

Id.

The magnitude of the crime

trnlµfu l comparison as does the culpability of the
Al though the Court in Helms struck down the

l I.

lire without possibility of parole, the application
s:oportianality review analysis should prevent sentencing
Utah's less stringent habitual criminal statute.

Utah

,je Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended) provides for a sentence
•. fi·re years to life for the habitual offender.

This Court recently reviewed Utah's habitual
·rirnin•r: statute in State v. Montague, 671 P. 2d 187

:•1tah J'ci,'l3). This Court announced Utah's policy is to punish
rather than attempt to reform them.
lJzing the statute,
•,L

In

this Court left open the question of

·:on0tit 1,tionality of the statute under an Eighth Amendment
review.
Appellant's prior felony convictions were all property
In looking at the gravity of the offense and the

• 1

penalty, this Court should compare property

i·srJnr-o.ss Gf the

.cr.

L3 r-S

serious and violent crimes such as assault,

IJ

As the Court noted in Helms, "nonviolent
:•:eorious than crimes marked by violence or the

:,,,.,

r n'F·."
i,; s

:, c, r

r,r
n'

Id. at 3011.
TJtah' s statute constitutes cruel and

CJ.s applied.
th,c.

Appellant received the most

state could impose for any crime short

-23-

of a capital offense.

Helms similarly received the most ,..•

punishment South Dakota could impose on any criminal for
crime. Id. at 3013.

::r

Like Helms, Appellant's record shows

instances of violence.

Id. n.

r,

22.

In Helms, the Supreme Court noted lack of incent\·".
for rehabilitation under such recidivist sentencing.

Clearl.i'

Utah's statute discourages most incentives for rehabilitatiofi
of property offenders.

The imposition of the sentence under

the habitual criminal statute was an unconstitutional punishm"
where the penalty is so disproportionate to other violent
recidivist offenders.
B.

IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW ADMISSION OF GUILTY
PLEAS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION TO DETERMINE
IF THE PLEAS WERE VOLUNTARILY MADE AND
WHETHER APPELLANT HAD ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION.
In Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S.

238, 242 (1969), the

Supreme Court stated, "[a] dmissibili ty of a confession must
be based on a reliable determination of the voluntariness Jssc:
which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant."

After Boykin courts could no longer presume waivers of the pr\·.•
against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, or
the right to confront one's accusers where the record is siltn:
Burgett v. Texas,

389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967) similarly starci

the waiver of the right to c<rnnsel coulrJ not bp pr•c2°'l1T1e•J f•'·
a silent record.

The Supreme Court reversed a

Burgett where evidence of a prior con·.Jiction wlth nr, ir:Ji·
in the record that counsel had been wa 1 ved rr·a•'h"' j

t Jir· jur.:'

r,

,

1,et

·ir<t'r: lire

·ill

.1,•Jt

was charged.

IQ_,_ at 112-13.

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.

In
1

it ioner was not convicted under recidivist statute

t

459 (1969), the

hPld that a guilty plea was invalid where the trial

';dge ra1led tu personally inquire of the defendant whether he
c0jerstond the charges and the consequences of the plea.

The

,,,., rejected imposing the burden on the State of demonstrating
r,0ru the record that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly

•nter2J in favor of setting aside the plea where Rule 11 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure
viit''·

2

was not strictly complied

Although McCarthy was based on the Federal rules, the

18nguage suggests the defendant must be informed of the nature
cf the charges and the consequences of the plea for a plea to

At trial, Appellant's attorney objected to admission
tl1e affidavit

from the 1976 conviction on the basis no

was listed.

"It says 'of my own free will I

·onferred with my attorney,

'--"(T.178).

Furthermore,

Arnellant argues his guilty plea under the 1964 conviction was
"''Jlunlarily entered:

Q·

(By Ms. Carter) Why did you enter it?

A

I was promised by the District Attorney
·ry lnwyer that I would get probation.

r,rth the rights the defendant must be advised
a plea.

'·' i·J
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Q:

And what happened to you?

A:

I was committed to the Utah State Prison

Q:

If you had known that was going to happen,

would that have changed what you had done?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And what would you have done if you would

have known that?
A:
(T.198).

I would have pled not guilty.

Specifically, Appellant's attorney asked him

he was ever read or asked whether he knew he would not have a
trial in the case and of what he was advised.
"[Nlo, it was in the judge's chambers.
guilty?' I

said,

'Yes."'

(T.200).

the standards of Boykin v.

Just,

Appellant repL
'Do you plead

The record clearly indicat':

Alabama, Burgett v. Texas, and McC; __

v. Unites States were not met in the present case.
In this case Appellant has demonstrated his lack of
understanding or knowledge of the consequences of entering "
guilty plea or the rights he waived.

Admission of the affid3

without adequate foundation denied Appellant's due process
Therefore, the habitual criminal conviction based upon a canst:·
tionally infirm plea should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's convictions should be reversed and
new trial granted.

It was unfair to Appellant to refuse '

the count alleging possessi'_'n of a firParm sl1ould hav,:·
severed; the motion

timPly madP and the count's jolndPr

unfairly prejudiced Apor1

v-, u·,e jury.

·J

:1",·'

11F1s

These errors were further compounded

seen by three jurors in shackles.

r

Appellant had not proved.

Finally, the habitual

statute as applied to property offenders is unconsti-

:onJ l ly •:ruP 1 and unusual punishment.
1·

The

·-''·')made improper, prejudicial comments to the jury

·.r

·ur,a l

when inadmissible evidence of other crimes

r· l:i 1

crrl

r

Appellant's conviction

st:citute was further infirm as there was no adequate
laid for the pleas on two of the three convictions.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks to

r,a;e t•Js convictions reversed and a new trial ordered.

fJATED this

day of April, 1984.
Respectfully submitted,

iNDAE: CARTER
Attorney for Appellant
•

"tc;r-_

1

E:LIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney

l's Offir'.e, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
this __·_ day of April, 1984.
,1'.
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